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ABSTRACT
Explaining Suicide in the  
Imperial German Army 
Andrew G. Bonnell
As social science evolved during the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
phenomenon of suicide received significant attention from sociologists. The issue 
of the frequency of suicides in the Imperial German armed forces proved highly 
sensitive. Official sources sought to minimize evidence of the mistreatment of 
soldiers in their presentation of suicide data, while critics of militarism, espe-
cially in the Social Democratic Party, used suicides in the military to expose what 
they regarded as systemic abuse. The issue became a case study in the potential 
politicization of social science findings and the polarization of public discourse in 
Imperial Germany.
As social science developed in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, suicide emerged as a phenomenon that merited systematic attention.1 In 
the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, according to Ursula Baumann, 
the discourses concerning suicide also became a “preferred field for the conduct of 
political and ideological controversies,” a trend amplified by the broadening of public 
participation in such debates in this period.2 The discovery by late nineteenth-century 
sociologists that suicide rates were disproportionately high in the armed forces posed 
particular difficulties for contemporary analysts, however, not least because it opened 
up the politically delicate issue of the maltreatment of army recruits. The mistreatment 
of army recruits was a constant theme in public debates over the army in Imperial 
Germany, and was regularly raised in parliaments and in the press.3 Only outright crit-
ics of the culture of the German military, such as Social Democrats or pacifists, could 
address the question without discomfort or obfuscation. Public discussion of the issue 
of suicides in the Imperial German army underlines Ursula Baumann’s more general 
point about the polarization of debates on suicide in Imperial Germany. Analysis of 
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the issue of soldiers’ suicides not only sheds light on the development of different 
strands of social science in late nineteenth- / early twentieth-century Germany, it 
also suggests the degree to which social scientific debate on the question was unable 
to escape the politicization that resulted from the wider sociopolitical divisions over 
militarism in German society.
The emergent social sciences in late nineteenth-century Germany had a strong link 
to the tradition of the Staatswissenschaften, the sciences of state, which had a strong 
practical orientation toward facilitating efficient government and administration.4 
Demographic statistical knowledge in all its forms was of considerable importance, 
partly as an index of the potential military strength of the state. Social science also 
drew on the empirical work, combining field work, questionnaires, and statistics, of 
social reform associations in Bismarckian Germany. Both the cameralist and social 
reform tendencies of early social science in Germany were influenced in the 1860s 
and 1870s by the field of “Moral Statistics” developed by Adolphe Quetelet.5 Already 
in 1864, Adolph Wagner attempted to apply Quetelet’s approach to discovering the 
statistical laws underlying various kinds of human behavior to the analysis of suicide 
rates.6 By the 1860s, then, suicide statistics were also seen as an indicator of the moral 
well-being of a society moving toward a more industrialized economy. 
Emile Durkheim’s study of suicide, first published in French in 1897, made it quite 
clear that in all European countries for which figures existed, the suicide rate among 
soldiers was higher than among the civilian population, even allowing for factors such 
as age and sex. Only in Denmark was the difference inconsiderable.7 Durkheim’s 
comparative national data, including Prussia, Württemberg, and Saxony, went up to 
1890, although the exact timeframes differed from country to country. The Austrian 
military recorded the highest incidence of suicide relative to the civilian population 
of military age (10 times as high). The Saxon and Prussian armies had the highest 
number of suicides per million soldiers after Austria, although the difference between 
suicide rates in the army and the civilian population in these states was not as high 
as in Austria or England, but was higher than in France.8
While Durkheim interpreted the increasing suicide rates in modern society as 
a byproduct of the extreme growth in individuation in contemporary civilization, 
loosening the social moorings of the personality, he perceived the opposite trend 
in the military, in which the individual was subject to an impersonal regime that 
subordinated the individual personality to a group identity, as in “lower,” premodern 
societies. Durkheim consequently classified suicide in the army as a form of “altru-
istic” suicide, i.e., the product of an inability to live up to the expected norms of the 
group.9 Writing in 1881, in a study published in Vienna, Thomas G. Masaryk had 
advanced other possible causes for the high rate of suicide among soldiers, despite 
their youth, good health, and basic material security: homesickness experienced by 
youthful soldiers torn away from familiar surroundings (perhaps particularly relevant 
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in a multinational, multilingual army like the Austro-Hungarian), greater prevalence 
of mental illness and dipsomania in the military, fear of punishment, the hardships 
of military life, and the immoral influences of barracks life. Military life itself was 
inherently demoralizing.10
The state of knowledge on the statistical analysis of suicide at the end of the nine-
teenth century was summed up by Georg von Mayr in his entry in the encyclopedic 
reference work for the Staatswissenschaften, the Handwörterbuch der Staatswis-
senschaften, edited by the Halle Professor Johannes Conrad. Von Mayr’s work partly 
reflected the influence of the “Moral Statistics” school of the 1860s and 1870s on the 
Staatswissenschaften, although Oberschall has commented that in von Mayr’s hands, 
moral statistics “had become but another form of social bookkeeping.”11 Von Mayr’s 
contribution on suicide statistics presented comparative national data on suicide, 
and data on age, sex, profession, religious confession, seasonal variation,12 and the 
rural or urban background of suicides, as well as data on the means of committing 
suicide and an attempt at a classification of motives for suicide.13 Under “profession,” 
von Mayr stated that space was lacking to deal with the “special question of military 
suicides in more detail.” He pointed to a recent comparative study (by R. Longuet), 
which showed that in the period 1875–1887, the Austrian army had the highest 
suicide rates (122 for 100,000 men), while the German army had 67 suicides per 
100,000 men in 1887/1888, compared with 40 in Italy (for 1874–1879) and 29 for 
France (1872–1889, not including the French army in Algeria and Tunisia, which 
had a suicide rate of 63 per 100,000). Von Mayr suggested that military suicides 
might be affected by geographical and seasonal factors, like those of the population 
as a whole, but did not explain why the rate was so high compared with the rest of 
the population, aside from a short reference to the age groups involved. Von Mayr 
noted that the suicide rate had gone down in the German army, to 44 per 100,000 
in 1896/1897, and quoted figures showing variation across different army corps, with 
higher rates in some Prussian and Saxon corps, and lower rates in Bavarian corps.14 
By 1894, the Militär-Wochenblatt observed that the “puzzling” phenomenon 
of soldiers taking their own lives was becoming the subject of “annually recurring 
demonstrations in public meetings, the daily press and specialist journals,” and was 
moved to address in its own pages the question of suicide in the Prussian army.15 This 
journal, written for a readership consisting largely of army officers, sought to relativize 
and minimize the issue as much as it could. Undertaking to put the problem in the 
correct perspective, the military journal began by stressing firstly that suicide increased 
in all states in step with the progress of cultural development.16 Secondly, it was noted 
that peoples of Germanic origin had the strongest tendency toward a higher suicide 
rate. Within Germany, the ethnic character of Germany’s different tribes was also 
reflected in different suicide rates (highest among the Saxons and their neighbors, 
decreasing toward the South and West, but increasing again in the North due to the 
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admixture of Danish elements. Slavic elements in the East of Prussia contributed to 
a lower suicide rate in Prussia’s eastern provinces.)17 Religious confession was found 
to be a relevant factor, along with race and ethnic origin. Seasonal factors were also 
statistically relevant.18 
Given that Germanic peoples were more likely to have a high suicide rate than 
others, it was only to be expected that the German and Austrian armies would show 
a higher suicide rate than other European armies, as statistics from 1876 to 1892 
showed they did.19 The different suicide rates among Saxon, Prussian, and Bavar-
ian army corps, and units from other states, were held to reflect different rates in 
the population of these states as a whole.20 After reciting these factors, the Militär-
Wochenblatt’s author finally conceded that “in all armies the suicide figures are 
generally higher than among the male population of the same age in the relevant 
states.” In Prussia, the suicide rate was 1.8 times higher than that of the male civilian 
population from twenty to thirty years of age, while in Austria the rate was 8 times as 
high in the army.21 Factors specific to military service would have to be considered, 
even though the Militär-Wochenblatt stressed that all suicides were identified and 
counted as such in the Prussian army, to an extent that was not achieved in civilian 
life, where families had greater opportunities to cover up suicides.22 One causal factor 
which the Militär-Wochenblatt was willing to countenance was the high proportion of 
soldiers who occupied barracks in towns and cities. It was notorious that the suicide 
rate was higher among the urban population than among the rural population. Soldiers 
were taken from the healthy milieu of the countryside and exposed to the morbid 
influences of urban life. Their vulnerability was exacerbated by the fact that most 
rank-and-file recruits were unmarried, which was in itself a risk factor for suicide.
Suicide statistics further revealed that profession had an influence on suicide 
rates, with the servant class displaying a relatively high suicide rate. Military service 
could be seen as partly analogous to working as a servant, given the restrictions on 
personal autonomy.23 Finally arriving at a comparison of presumed causes of suicide 
between cases in the Prussian army and those in the civilian population from 1876 
to 1890, figures showed that while “tiredness with life” (Lebensüberdruß) and bodily 
complaints caused only 2% and 1% respectively of deaths in the military, among 
civilian counterparts the figures were 9% and 7%. There was a far higher rate of 
suicides caused by mental illness in the civilian population (29% compared with 7% 
in the army), but nearly one third of suicides in the army were attributed to “fear 
of punishment,” while the closest equivalent in the civilian population was 8% due 
to “remorse, shame, pangs of conscience.”24 The Militär-Wochenblatt saw the great 
majority of cases of “fear of punishment” as resulting from “offences against military 
discipline, that indispensable cornerstone of the solid edifice of our military.”25 It 
was unavoidable that among the “great mass of those who come out of their military 
training with unmistakable and universally recognized benefits for their whole spiritual 
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and physical development,” there would be some individuals who failed to live up 
to the demands of their new situation. These were most likely to be “psychologically 
handicapped, weak-willed, or mentally inferior” specimens, who needed to be identi-
fied early and culled from the ranks.26 
The Militär-Wochenblatt sought to refute the “unjustified” opinion that the suicide 
rate in the military was the result of “inappropriate treatment or even mistreatment 
of soldiers.” Officially, only 1.5% of suicides in the army were diagnosed as the result 
of “inappropriate treatment or mistreatment.”27 The writer did not, however, draw 
attention to the very large number of open verdicts: 32% of suicides in the army were 
listed as the result of “other or unknown causes,” compared with 18% of civilian cases, 
despite the writer’s emphasis on the more rigorous investigation in the military.28 
As von Mayr noted, since 1 January 1869, the gathering of statistics on military 
suicides had been entrusted to the military authorities, instead of the civilian authori-
ties, which had previously been responsible.29 If suicides were harder to conceal in 
the army than in civilian life, the army had a degree of control over how the causes 
of suicide were interpreted. In conclusion, the Militär-Wochenblatt enjoined anyone 
who wished to reduce the suicide rate in the army to refrain from spreading misleading 
reports about the topic, out of “ignorance,” lest such unsubstantiated rumors them-
selves have a harmful effect on reluctant young conscripts, preparing “the ground on 
which the thought of suicide might germinate,” even if the actual occasion for such 
a deed proved to be trivial in itself.30 Public discussion of the topic should therefore 
be discouraged, was the tenor of this conclusion.
Another view from within the armed forces, but in a more scholarly form, was 
offered by Rudolf Gruner, Unterarzt with the 2nd Lithuanian Field Artillery Regiment, 
in his doctoral dissertation for the medical faculty of Berlin University in 1903. Gruner 
also took explicit objection to the frequent public claims that mistreatment of soldiers 
was the main cause of the high number of suicides in the army.31 Like the Militär-
Wochenblatt, Gruner began by stressing that suicide rates generally were influenced 
by cultural development and higher levels of education, and saw a link between 
ethnoracial influences and different suicide rates in different regions of Germany.32 
He also pointed to the frequency of suicide among the servant class, from which 
so many soldiers were drawn, and followed the army weekly in suggesting that the 
higher suicide rate in cities indicated a negative effect on soldiers garrisoned in them 
(through the exposure of simple country youths to the temptations and distractions 
of the cities).33 Age, sex, marital status, and seasonal influences were all identified as 
relevant factors, although they were hardly factors that distinguished soldiers from 
their contemporaries in civilian life.34
Gruner analyzed variations in the suicide rate between different army corps 
(reflecting different suicide rates in the regions they were drawn from), different 
arms of the military (infantry, cavalry, artillery, pioneers, Landwehr, etc.), and men 
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of different ranks (noncommissioned officers were twice as likely to kill themselves 
as privates, figures for officers were not available).35 Gruner also analyzed means of 
committing suicide among soldiers (around half used firearms, with hanging the next 
common cause of death).36
Like the Miltär-Wochenblatt, Gruner drew on the official statistics on causes of 
suicide in the German army, taking the figures from 1884 to 1898 (during which the 
average number of suicides per year was 261, not including officers), and gave the 
figures his own gloss.
Cause Percentage of Cases
fear of punishment 34.8
mental disturbance 9.2
reluctance to remain in service 6.1
(Unlust zum Dienst) injured sense of honor 5.7
passions (love, etc.) 4.2
unhappy family circumstances, financial ruin 3.8
tiredness of life 3.4
physical complaints 2.3
vice (alcohol, etc.) 1.5
remorse, shame, pangs of conscience 1.2
feeling of inadequacy for demands of service 0.4
mistreatment by superiors 0.04
fear of examinations 0.04
unknown causes 24.937
Gruner, like the military periodical, insisted that offences against military disci-
pline involved threats to “one of the fundamental conditions for the existence and 
prestige of a well-functioning army.”38 An injury to a sense of honor, “the cultivation 
of which is of the highest concern to the army’s administration,” was seen to be a 
particularly relevant factor in the case of noncommissioned officers (especially among 
those degraded to the ranks).39 Given the youth and usual good health of young army 
recruits (who had had to pass a medical examination when called up), physical 
complaints might also be found more frequently among the older noncommissioned 
officers, although Gruner claimed that the stereotypical assumption that alcoholism 
was highly prevalent in these circles was an exaggeration.40
Even compared with the 1.5% of cases given by the Miltär-Wochenblatt as 
caused by mistreatment, Gruner’s 0.04% of cases is a surprisingly miniscule figure 
(amounting to an average single case a year in the entire German army, out of over 
3,900 suicides over a fifteen-year period). The difference between the two sets of 
figures may arise from a different time frame, in which the suicide rate as a whole 
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was declining (after a peak in the early 1880s), but may also relate to the difference 
between the Prussian army (the basis of the earlier study), and the German army as 
a whole. Although Gruner conceded that in a few cases noncommissioned officers 
from plebeian backgrounds, who had undergone tough training themselves, may 
have made mistakes with recruits, he emphasized that mistreatment was much less 
common than liberal circles outside the army might claim, and that the suicide rate 
in the army was explicable by the same factors as in the general population, with the 
difference that the army concentrated a large number of unmarried young men in 
garrison towns and cities, tending to magnify the risk factors.41
In 1909, Otto von Schjerning considered the suicide rate in the Prussian army 
from the point of view of military medicine.42 Von Schjerning cited figures that showed 
that in the years 1901–1906, despite a mostly steady decline since 1873–1874, the 
suicide rate in the Prussian army was still higher than in any other European army, 
with the exception of the Austrian. (Of 10,000 men, 4.2 committed suicide on aver-
age in Prussia, compared with 9.9 in the Austro-Hungarian army, 1.2 in the Dutch, 
1.3 in the Russian, 1.5 in the Belgian, 1.8 in the French, 3.1 in the Bavarian, and 
3.2 in the Italian).43 Like other military writers on this question, von Schjerning 
emphasized the operation of general causes of suicide on the troops, denying that the 
army itself was responsible for suicides, except in so far as military service provided 
the external occasions for suicides that might have happened in any other environ-
ment.44 Unfortunately, the tendency toward suicide in both the army and the people 
as a whole was “rooted in the character of the Germanic people.” The only way to 
reduce suicide rates was to strengthen the nation, and steel its character, “the way 
one equips an army with more and more perfect weapons,” so that the nation can 
meet the demands of its struggle for existence.45
Other medical authorities and social reformers approached the question of sui-
cide in the military from their own perspectives. Dr. Friedrich Prinzing, a medical 
practitioner in Ulm, was particularly concerned with alcoholism as a causal factor 
in suicide. Prinzing had relatively little to say about the suicide rate in the military, 
which was incidental to the main object of his inquiry. In a chapter surveying the role 
of profession or sphere of employment in suicide rates, he wrote:
Very many suicides occur in the military and detailed investigations of this have 
been conducted. Remorse and fear of punishment are the main motives, since the 
feeling of honor is much intensified and small offences, whether committed out of 
youthful frivolity or in a state of alcoholic intoxication, are often subject to severe 
punishment; it must also be emphasized that in no estate is so little consideration 
paid to the emotions [das Gemüt], although it is precisely in the age soldiers are in 
that the emotional life plays a great role.46 
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Perhaps Prinzing might have derived some reassurance from Gruner’s claim that 
alcohol abuse was not very prevalent in the army’s ranks: the rigors of contemporary 
military service meant that troops had little time to sit in pubs, and “in addition, the 
common musketeer is seldom in the possession of sufficient riches to permit him to 
forget the worries of the service in alcoholic intoxication.”47 However, Prinzing did 
not exempt the military from the general pathology of modern civilization, character-
ized by a restless striving both to get ahead and to seek amusement and distraction, 
including in alcohol, all of which created the “neuropathic foundation” on which 
“psychosis and suicide” flourish, and, to make matters worse, this syndrome was 
easily inherited by the next generation.48
Catholic social reformers also concerned themselves with the problem of suicide, 
tending to see it as a product of the negative side of modern civilization and increasing 
secular influences. In the introduction to his 1905 investigation of suicide as a social 
statistical phenomenon, the Catholic writer Hans Rost saw suicides as “a yardstick 
for the culture and moral strength of a people,” indicating whether one lived in an 
age of “materialist tendencies” or in a time of “pious, reverent, faith in God.” Suicide 
was a product of moral decline.49 Rost devoted a subsection of his chapter on social 
factors affecting suicide rates to the military.
A number of factors contributed to the high suicide rates (and incidence of 
attempted suicide, a phenomenon passed over by military writers) in the armed forces, 
according to Rost, who emphasized more qualitative influences than statistically 
quantifiable factors: soldiers gave up their individual freedom, and were treated in an 
impersonal fashion by military discipline; soldiers were torn from their families and 
often transported to places far from home; the soldier’s life was hard and strenuous, 
and: “There is little room in the barracks for soul and emotional life.” Rost added 
that the educational level manifest in the barracks was such that “mistreatment of 
soldiers in the coarsest manner, vulgar turns of speech and blasphemous swearwords” 
were regarded as necessary for the troops’ training. Rost cited Masaryk on soldiers’ 
homesickness and the demoralizing influences of barracks life. On the other hand, 
troops were healthy and had no worries about immediate material security.50 
Rost felt it was difficult to determine “the extent to which militarism is to blame for 
the frequency of suicides in the army.” However, despite some careful qualification, 
he found the “frequent connection of suicide and military bullying” undeniable. The 
mistreatment of soldiers, as reported in parliament, sometimes “verged on bestial-
ity.” The “charge remains fully upheld that the spirit that exists in the military, the 
manner of treating people, and other military customs have the majority of soldiers’ 
suicides on their conscience.”51 However, Rost welcomed the significant decline in 
the number of suicides in the Bavarian army, down from 43 in 1886 to 16 in 1899 
(including officers, who were listed in published Bavarian statistics).52 The suicide 
rate remained exceptionally high in Austria, which Rost attributed to the persistence 
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of “barbaric punishments, like confinement in stress positions [Krummschließen] and 
tying up [Anbinden].”53 In contrast to military analysts, Rost saw the high proportion 
of suicides reportedly motivated by “fear of punishment” as pointing to faults in the 
system of military discipline and training.54 Rost drew two main conclusions from 
his brief survey of suicide in the military: religion was one of the strongest factors 
inhibiting an increase in the suicide rate, and the officer corps needed to ensure 
that religion was treated with more respect than was normally the case in daily army 
life, and it was necessary to continue public campaigns, including in parliament, to 
reduce the incidence of mistreatment of soldiers. A more humane approach to military 
discipline was called for.55
Another Catholic view on the incidence of suicide was published by the Jesuit 
H.A. Krose in essays in the periodical Stimmen aus Maria-Laach. Katholische Blätter. 
Krose, the foremost exponent of statistical research in the German Catholic church in 
this period and a founding figure of Catholic social research, drew on Masaryk, Durk-
heim, and von Mayr (under whom he had studied) in his analysis of the geographical 
distribution of suicide in nineteenth-century Europe and of the frequency of suicide.56 
Krose recounted the statistics showing the high suicide rate in the military (especially 
in Austria), but aside from pointing to the official classification of reported motives 
he refrained from drawing any conclusions about mistreatment of soldiers.57 Instead 
of antimilitaristic reflections, Krose represented suicide as ultimately a moral failing 
of the individual, against which (Catholic) religion formed the strongest protection, 
and he deplored the deleterious influence of the contemporary press and literature.58 
Dieter Riesenberger has recently pointed to a tradition of Catholic antimilitarism 
in the Kaiserreich.59 Rost’s work, using the term “militarism,” frankly condemning the 
mistreatment of soldiers, and criticizing the disregard for both religion and human-
ity in the barracks, could be grouped with this tradition, even if the antimilitarist 
argument only constitutes one part of his study. Krose’s work is more cautious and 
conservative by comparison. Krose was more concerned with using statistics to assess 
the moral health of a confessional community.
More consistently forthright in criticizing the militarism of the Prussian-German 
army were Social Democrats. The Social Democratic press regularly carried reports 
of abuses of army recruits, some cases of which were claimed to have resulted in 
suicide. From the 1870s on, Social Democrat members of the Reichstag pointed to 
suicides in the army as evidence of the oppressive class nature of the standing army, 
which set out to break the spirit of any recruits with a healthy rebellious nature.60 
The issue of suicide in the army was made the subject of an article in the theoretical 
and “scientific” journal of the party in 1912. In this article, Salo Drucker, drawing 
on von Mayr’s figures, began with the trend toward a higher suicide rate in “Kultur-
ländern,” interpreting it as connected with the conditions of intensified “struggle for 
existence” under advanced capitalism.61 Suicide in the army was, Drucker went on to 
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note,  considerably more frequent than in civilian life, despite the fact that the army 
consisted of young men whose health was regularly checked by doctors, and who had 
no need to worry about their daily bread or shelter. The medical report of the Prus-
sian, Saxon, and Württemberg armies for 1908/09 showed 221 suicides by soldiers 
in the report year, 0.40 suicides per thousand men. (In addition, there were over 100 
recorded unsuccessful suicide attempts.)62 After analyzing comparative international 
figures, and differences between enlisted men and noncommissioned officers (officers 
were left out of the official medical statistics), and between different arms of the mili-
tary, Drucker proceeded to consider the causes of the high suicide rate in the army. 
Officially, ten deaths in the previous six years were attributed to “mistreatment and 
abuse of authority,” or as, Drucker would put it, to the abuses of militarism, which 
were shameful in themselves for the “Kulturstaat Deutschland.” Drucker went on to 
express skepticism about whether the other officially cited causes of soldiers’ suicides 
might not conceal other incidents of abuse, noting the high number of suicides 
attributed to “fear of punishment.” The high number of noncommissioned officers’ 
suicides attributable to this cause was easily explained, in Drucker’s view, given the 
longer-term implications of punishment both for NCOs’ careers within the army and 
for their hopes of a comfortable government-funded job after their military service.63 
Drucker noted that the usual seasonal fluctuation of the suicide rate in the popula-
tion at large was different in the army, where greater numbers of suicides occurred 
around large exercises and early in recruits’ service, which pointed to causal factors 
within the army, rather than external factors.64 He also found the large number of 
unexplained cases (or inadequately explained—surely all suicides could be said to 
be “tired of life,” as one category of cause was called) remarkable given the degree of 
control and surveillance to which army recruits were subject.65 Drucker concluded 
not only by calling for improved psychiatric attention to recruits, but also by calling 
for a “thorough change of the whole [system of] militarism,” if the number of suicides 
was to be reduced. “Insults and cases of mistreatment” were responsible for the loss 
of “hundreds of sons of the people every year.”66 Salo Drucker’s article was not really 
methodologically innovative in that it did not attempt to develop or apply specifically 
Marxian sociological concepts. His work differed from others in the degree to which 
it gave uninhibited expression to a critique of the effects of militarism.
The connection between the mistreatment of soldiers and the incidence of suicide 
in the armed forces sometimes arose in the debates in the Reichstag (and in state 
parliaments) on the treatment of army recruits.67 While Social Democratic Reichstag 
deputies did not have a monopoly on expressions of concern over this issue, it was 
their voices that became predominant in discussions of the topic, especially after 
around 1900. In February 1883, for example, the left liberal deputy Eugen Richter 
spoke about the case of a grenadier in Liegnitz who had committed suicide after 
complaining of abuse in a series of letters to his family. Richter feared that this was 
 Andrew G. Bonnell 285
not an isolated case, citing a statistical report in the Militär-Wochenblatt that counted 
22 cases of suicide in the army, without counting the Bavarian contingents, for the 
previous November alone.68 In response, the representative of the Prussian Ministry 
of War, Lieutenant-General von Verdy du Vernois, objected to the public airing of 
such cases, while insisting that in no army were men as well treated by their officers 
as in the Prussian, and the conservative deputy von Kardorff erroneously claimed 
that suicide rates were considerably higher in other armies, including the British 
and French armies.69
In 1885, the Catholic Centre party deputy, Dr Joseph Lingens, used a hearing of 
the Reichstag’s budget commission to request statistics on the incidence of suicides 
in the Reich army, broken down into corps and regions. Lingens was seeking to deter-
mine whether or not the suicide rate in the army was in decline. Lingens was also 
interested in a breakdown of the figures by religious confession. The War Minister, 
von Bronsart Schellendorf, readily agreed to furnish the statistics, while claiming 
that the suicide rates in different army corps simply reflected those of their province 
of origin. The Saxon military representative to the Reichstag, Major von Schlieben, 
sought permission from his superiors to cooperate with this request for information.70 
Lingens continued to occupy himself with this topic over a number of years, less out 
of concern with the mistreatment of recruits, but rather more preoccupied with their 
spiritual well being. In 1894, Lingens returned to the theme of the significance of 
religious confession in suicide rates in the army. Describing suicide as a “companion 
of modern civilization,” he noted lower rates in Catholic regions, praised the Prus-
sian army for its increased interest in religious instruction for troops, and attributed 
the higher suicide rate in the Austrian army to liberal education policies which had 
allegedly banished religion and crosses from the schools.71
Increasingly, the Reichstag debates about suicide in the army and the abuse of 
recruits became dominated by Social Democrats, especially August Bebel, and the 
increasingly defensive and hostile responses of the military authorities.72 In February 
1896, the Saxon military envoy to Berlin, Count Paul von Vitzthum, reported to the 
Saxon Ministry of War that Bebel was up to his “tirades” against militarism, “in the 
usual manner,” making the “system of militarism” responsible for the number of 
suicides in the army. At the same time, Vitzthum noted that Bebel only cited cases 
from the Prussian army in that speech. Vitzthum was pleased to note that Bebel had 
to concede that a decline in the number of military suicides was the consequence 
of a decline in the incidence of cases of ill treatment: a causal nexus that the mili-
tary authorities otherwise publicly strenuously denied.73 The following year, in the 
Reichstag, Vitzthum was faced with specific references by Bebel to suicides in the 
Saxon army, when Bebel claimed that a single regiment, the 2nd Grenadier Regiment 
Nr.101, had suffered seven deaths from suicide within two years, figures that Vitz-
thum was unable to refute.74 Vitzthum’s successor as Saxon military envoy in Berlin, 
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Major Krug von Nidda, reporting on another speech by Bebel attacking abuses in the 
army, even referred to allegations of “suicide” in quotation marks in his report to his 
superiors in Dresden.75 While Prussian and Saxon military authorities had shown a 
degree of cooperativeness with Centre deputy Lingens’s enquiries, their responses to 
Social Democratic criticism over suicides in the armed forces amounted to displays 
of denial and stonewalling.
In Bavaria, the Social Democrats, notably Adolf Müller, also made use of the 
Bavarian lower house of parliament (Landtag) to dramatize the issue of mistreatment 
of soldiers.76 In Bavaria, unlike in Prussia and other states, courts martial were open 
to the public, which resulted in a greater degree of transparency when it came to 
allegations of mistreatment or questions about fatalities in the armed services There 
also seems to have been an effort by the Bavarian Ministry of War to investigate any 
accusations raised in the press or to initiate investigations into any matters which 
might give rise to questions in the Landtag.77 
However, despite the greater transparency that prevailed in Bavaria, the army 
was still able to influence the reporting of soldiers’ suicides, especially when it came 
to official interpretation of the causes of suicide. Surviving records indicate ways in 
which an official bias could determine the reporting of causes of suicide. In the case 
of a noncommissioned officer of the 1st Pioneer Battalion, Max Fuchs, stationed at 
Ingolstadt, who shot himself, the battalion commander insisted on a report on the 
“moral and religious condition” of the suicide, and sought to collect evidence on the 
possibility that the dead man had a sexually transmitted disease, despite the existence 
of a medical report which found no evidence of such a disease. Fuchs’s company 
commander had to report that a search of his locker showed no evidence to support 
this theory (and that he had attended church services as required). The most obvious 
cause for the suicide was that the noncommissioned officer had been caught borrowing 
money from subordinates and was facing a serious disciplinary charge for this, but 
the battalion commander seems to have gone to some lengths to find causes other 
than “fear of punishment.”78 A reference to a separate report on Fuchs’s moral and 
religious deportment was included in the battalion’s draft report and was evidently only 
crossed out when the company commander failed to come up with anything usable. 
The report still referred to the fear of punishment being aggravated by illness and a 
disturbed state of mind “presumably” connected with venereal disease, despite the 
lack of medical or other evidence to support that theory. The report stressed that no 
third party was at fault in Fuchs’s death.79 Medical speculation about the mental states 
of soldiers who committed or attempted suicide was still relatively unsophisticated, 
although the period after this case saw both an increase of psychiatric attention to 
suicide in the wider population of Bavaria, and the rise of closer collaboration between 
psychiatrists and the military. Ursula Baumann comments on the increasing tendency 
to subject attempted suicides to psychiatric examination that instead of seeing suicide 
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as the product of a moral deficiency, it was now possible to see it as the product of 
individual pathology, which avoided interpreting suicide as an intelligible response 
to a potentially intolerable situation.80 The medicalization of suicide coincided with 
what Martin Lengwiler has described as the partial institutionalization of military 
psychiatry in the years leading up to 1914, although Lengwiler stresses that the 
number of properly qualified military psychiatrists remained inadequate by the time 
of the outbreak of World War I.81 
Such attempts to influence the interpretation of the causes of suicide as the one 
outlined above were not limited to the efforts of zealous midranking officers; they 
increasingly reflected official policy. In July 1909, the Bavarian Ministry of War issued 
a general order to all units regarding suicides in the Bavarian Army. In future, all 
reports concerning suicides or attempted suicides were required to include details 
on the financial circumstances of the relevant soldier, and whether there was any 
history of suicide or mental disturbance in his family.82 In the following period, even 
where there seemed to be a logical proximate causal factor leading to a suicide (such 
as a soldier facing a serious disciplinary charge or punishment), company officers 
dutifully set about enquiring about family histories and money problems. On the 
other hand, canvassing the possibility of mistreatment, even if only to rule it out, 
was not encouraged. In one instance, for example, the Bavarian 5th Division was 
censured by the Ministry of War in the following terms: “The finding that there is no 
suspicion of treatment of Krügel [that was] contrary to regulations did not require 
such detailed justification on the part of the 5th Division.”83 Even when a soldier left 
a suicide note, published in the press, in which the reason for the action was given as 
fear of unjust punishment by a named superior officer, military authorities felt able 
to disregard such evidence in favor of reports about the soldier’s drinking and alleged 
womanizing (“his disorderly and immoral way of life”), or findings of irregularities 
in the lining of the brain found after an autopsy.84 The evidence in the Bavarian 
military archives indicates a parallel with the findings of Hannes Leidinger’s analysis 
of suicide in the Austro-Hungarian army: “The military was, as a rule, unwilling to 
countenance mistreatment of recruits, in particular, or of longer-serving soldiers, as 
a cause of suicides.”85 The result of such policies was that the data used by analysts 
such as Gruner had already passed through the filter of official military interpretation 
of the evidence. 
The incidence of mistreatment and suicide in the army was frequently raised in the 
Social Democratic press, as part of the general socialist critique of militarism, which 
was a constant theme of the party’s newspapers. Stargardt writes that from the 1890s, 
Social Democracy “became the only major political force to carry the antimilitarist 
banner.”86 Already in the early 1870s, not long after the foundation of the Reich 
in the victory over France, the Neuer Social-Demokrat, for example, often carried 
reports on the mistreatment of soldiers under the heading “Soldatenelend,” including 
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reporting cases of suicide which it linked to abuse of soldiers by superiors.87 Critical 
analyses of militarism in party journals like Die Neue Zeit were coupled with broad 
campaigns in the party press, appealing to the party’s mass constituency, against the 
abuse of recruits. References to such articles in the party press could be multiplied. 
Criticism of the army could, however, be hazardous for Social Democratic newspa-
per editors, and military authorities often reacted to allegations of abuse of soldiers 
by seeking to lay charges against editors for “insulting the army,” which potentially 
inhibited discussion of the causes of suicide in the army. To take one example, in 
1899 Dr Max Quarck, an editor of the Social Democratic newspaper Die Volksstimme 
in Frankfurt am Main, was prosecuted and fined 300 Marks (or a month’s imprison-
ment in case of failure to pay the fine), plus costs, for an article in the Volksstimme 
that reported on the death of a soldier in the 9th Baden Infantry Regiment No. 170, 
one Franz Bechtold, who was reportedly found hanged. The soldier’s family had cast 
doubt on the official version of Bechtold’s death, and Social Democratic newspapers 
called for a full investigation.88 That Quarck’s prosecution was not an isolated case 
is illustrated by the fact that the same Social Democratic newspaper, the Frankfurt 
Volksstimme, was charged on other occasions with insulting the military. A colleague 
of Quarck, the Reichstag deputy Wilhelm Schmidt, was sentenced to three months’ 
imprisonment in 1898 (which were served in full) for his commentary on a soldier’s 
death from heatstroke while on a forced march during training.89 Like the frequent 
charges of lèse-majesté against Social Democratic newspaper editors, charges of libel 
of the army or named officers were frequently invoked to protect the authorities from 
political attacks, imposing boundaries on permissible public discourse in the process.
An advocate of army reform, and a critic of existing military discipline, the Bavar-
ian ex-lieutenant Rudolf Krafft faced ostracism in army circles, but found a platform 
in the Social Democratic party press,90 and became an occasional contributor to 
Die Neue Zeit on military matters. In his 1895 book Kasernen-Elend (Misery in the 
Barracks), Krafft explicitly linked draconian disciplinary punishments to the high 
incidence of suicide among soldiers.91 Krafft followed up this work with a second 
short book in 1904, called Opfer der Kaserne (Victims of the Barracks).92 The book 
received prominent coverage in the Social Democratic party press.93 The Bavarian 
Ministry of War sought to get Krafft’s 1904 book suppressed, but the Bavarian Ministry 
of Justice, after consulting the state prosecutor’s office, ruled that a prosecution of 
Krafft would be unlikely to succeed.94 Krafft was not alone among Social Democratic 
writers in linking harsh treatment of soldiers and suicide; writing in Die Neue Zeit, 
Ernst Däumig also drew a connection between inhumane treatment of enlisted men 
and suicide.95
The issue of suicide in the military took on enormous political significance in the 
first half of 1914, after a speech by Rosa Luxemburg in Freiburg attacked abuses of 
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recruits which allegedly resulted in suicides. Luxemburg spoke of “countless dramas 
which are played out, day in and day out, in German barracks, whence the groans of 
the tormented seldom reach our ears.”96 The attempt to prosecute Luxemburg for 
insulting the army unleashed a flood of witness statements from men claiming to 
have experienced abuse in the army, which rolled in at the start of the trial in late 
June, prompting the indefinite adjournment of the trial (although Luxemburg had 
already been sentenced for “inciting disobedience” in the army in a trial in Frankfurt 
in February 1914).97 In July 1914, just a couple of weeks before the German empire 
mobilized for war, some German Social Democratic newspapers carried on their 
front pages a detailed statistical account of cases of suicides, attempted suicides, 
self-mutilations, and other incidents in the German army, including not only a table 
showing suicides and other incidents in the army from 1879 to 1910/1911 and in 
the German navy from 1885/1886 to 1893/1894, but also a table showing suicides in 
the German military compared with other European armies. The Social Democratic 
press stated that the figures, retrieved from “the obscurity of official statistics” (i.e., 
the medical reports of the armies of the different German states, as well as drawing on 
the Militär-Wochenblatt article of 1894), showed Germany to have the worst suicide 
rate among soldiers, which was held up as evidence of Germany’s miserable social 
conditions and of the “culture” of the militarist imperial state.98
On one reading of the evolution of the social sciences in Imperial Germany, they 
can be seen as contributing to increasingly “modern,” rationalized, and technocratic 
forms of social discipline (along with new branches of knowledge such as the devel-
opment of military psychiatry).99 The debates over suicide in the military indicate, 
however, that where the interests of the traditional military elite were affected, the 
development of more rationalized and technocratic regimes of the administration of 
knowledge was potentially subject to the protection of such interests. The military 
shaped the collection of the statistical information and subjected the data to their 
own interpretive filter. The polarization of public discourse around the mistreatment 
of soldiers and suicides in the army, and the legal sanctions brought to bear against 
Social Democrats whose criticisms went beyond published court martial findings, may 
well have had an impact on the social scientific discussions of the topic. Apart from 
Social Democratic writers, and some antimilitarist Catholics, there was a reticence 
in exploring links between the abuse of soldiers and suicide rates. A causal link is of 
course hard to demonstrate, but there was clearly pressure from official quarters on 
social scientists to distance themselves from any suspicion of sympathies for Social 
Democracy. The case of Robert Michels, who was barred from Habilitation and any 
teaching post at a German university on the grounds of his activities as a Social Demo-
crat from 1902 to 1907, was well known among German sociologists.100 As a professor 
extraordinarius in Breslau, Werner Sombart was also clearly given to understand 
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that it would help his academic career if he demonstrated more distance from Social 
Democratic views on social questions and took part in propaganda activities for the 
buildup of the German Navy.101
The high suicide rate in the Imperial German army was self-evident for any reader 
of official statistics, even if these presented a selective and arguably sanitized picture of 
reality by the way in which they classified (or omitted) the presumed causes of suicide. 
This in itself constituted a challenge for any objective social scientific investigation 
of the problem. At the same time, the debates over suicides in the military indicated 
that statistics that were compiled for purposes of enhancing the power and efficiency 
of the state could also furnish evidence for the state’s critics. Public discussion of 
suicide in the armed forces was highly polarized, with forceful accusations from the 
left and evasion of the question on the right. Conservative and military writers went to 
extremes to minimize any link between the mistreatment of soldiers and suicide, while 
suicides were seen by Social Democrats, pacifists, and some antimilitarist Catholics, 
as a standing reproach to the culture of the standing army. In this context, social 
scientists unwilling to be identified with radical critics of the state took a cautious 
approach or avoided the topic altogether.
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